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Abstract
This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables cer-
tifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have strong implica-
tions for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Hon-
est certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static
monopoly price. 2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale
and constitutes a natural monopoly. 3) Price competition tends to a
monopolization. The results derive from a general principle of reputa-
tion models that favors concentration. This principle implies benefits
from specialization and explains specialized certifiers as efficient mar-
ket institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal article of Akerlof (1970) economists recognize that asym-
metric information has important effects on the allocation and distribution
of resources. This gives market participants incentives to undertake costly
actions to signal their private information (e.g. Spence 1973), invest in rep-
utation (e.g. Klein and Leffler 1981), or issue warranties. In addition, asym-
metric information may lead to a demand for certifying intermediaries who
try to reduce asymmetries by inspecting a party’s private information and
reveal findings publicly (e.g. Biglaiser 1993, Lizzeri 1999, Albano and Lizzeri
2001). Examples of certifiers are laboratories that test consumer products,
auditors who validate the accounts of firms, ISO registrars who certify qual-
ity standards of production processes, internet search engines that rank Web
sites, and schools that certify the ability of students.
Certifiers, however, may be tempted to accept bribes to certify product
quality. This behavior called capture, enables the certifier to extract pay-
ments for favorable endorsements and may relieve him of the need to spend
resources on determining product quality. This paper focuses on the role
of certifiers when consumers are aware that such threats of capture exist.
In particular, because consumers will learn if a certifier has been captured,
the certifier faces a classic reputation dilemma in deciding whether the short
term gain from capture is larger than the future profit losses from losing
public trust.
Although commercial markets involving certification function relatively
well, there exists evidence that problems of capture are a concern. The most
prominent recent example is the Andersen-Enron accounting scandal, where
Andersen, as Enron’s accountant, falsely certified Enron’s accounts as accu-
rate. To name two other cases that will motivate our modelling of capture: In
January 2002 the German government had to recall the meat of 26,000 cat-
tle after it was uncovered that a certifying laboratory had performed 40,000
dodgy BSE-tests. In March 2002 Sony Pictures was fined $325,000 for certi-
fying its own films by inventing fake reviews that it attributed to an actual
newspaper.
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Despite these examples, actual cases of capture are relatively rare. In
general certifiers do seem to be able to resist pressures of capture. This
paper investigates the role of reputation as a safeguard against capture. It
thereby shows that these considerations alone have strong implications for
the industrial organization of certification markets:
1. Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static
monopoly price.
2. Honest certification exhibits economies of scale.
3. Price competition tends to a monopolization of certification markets.
4. The threat of capture is responsible for a demand for external certifi-
cation.
We discuss these results in turn. First, from the literature on reputation
(e.g. Klein and Leffler 1981, Shapiro 1983), it is well known that reputation
requires prices to exceed marginal costs. This holds for the current model
in an extreme way: For low discount factors even the static monopoly price
is too low to sustain a reputation for honesty. This result is new and, at
first sight, counter intuitive. The monopoly price maximizes the certifier’s
gain from honesty and one may therefore expect that it also minimizes the
overall threat of capture. Yet, since the price of certification also affects the
potential gain from capture, the overall threat of capture is minimized at
some higher price.1
To explain the other three results we start from the well–known observa-
tion that reputation models hinge on a trade–off between the short run gain
from cheating and the long run gain for honesty. Hence, when the certifier
expects a larger future demand, the long run gain rises and capture becomes
less attractive. It follows that honesty is easier to sustain when the number of
(future) certification jobs is high. This insight yields our second result that
honest certification exhibits increasing returns to scale. From this reason-
ing it also follows that a certifier can perform honest certification at a lower
1The underlying mechanism leading to prices that exceed monopoly prices is therefore
fundamentally different from that in models of signalling (e.g. Bagwell and Riordan 1991).
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price, when he serves the entire future demand himself rather than sharing it
with competitors. In a monopoly, therefore, a certifier may guarantee honest
certification at a lower price than in an oligopoly. This leads to our third
result that price competition tends to a monopolization of the certification
market.
Effectively, honest certification is easier to sustain when certification is
concentrated at one party. This general principle explains the existence of
external, specialized certifiers: For low discount factors a reputation for hon-
esty is only sustainable when there is one institution — an external certifier
— who provides this reputation rather than many independent ones — the
actual producers of goods. The insight constitutes our final result and solves
the more fundamental, institutional question why producers demand exter-
nal certification rather than build up their own reputation. Ultimately, we
demonstrate gains from specialization in reputation building. This provides
an economic justification for certifiers as an efficient market institution.
2 The Setup
It is instructive to start with a market setup in which in each period τ =
1, 2, . . . ,∞ a different, short–lived monopolistic producer enters with a single
unit of some quality qτ ∈ [0, 1]. Quality is stochastic and drawn from a uni-
form distribution that is i.i.d. of the qualities in previous periods. The good’s
quality represents the reservation price of consumers. Only the producer ob-
serves the quality, i.e., the market exhibits informational asymmetries. Each
producer is short–lived in that he leaves the market after offering his good
in a second price auction.2,3 Consumers observe the product’s quality only
after consumption. Production costs are zero. All variables other than the
product quality q are observable.
Without any further economic institutions, a producer cannot persuade
2The second price auction results in a standard monopoly price while circumventing nu-
merous complications associated with letting the informed party take a publicly–observed
action that may be interpreted as a signal.
3Section 5 considers a setup in which producers are long–lived.
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consumers of the quality of his good.4 Since Akerlof (1970) it has become
standard to compute the equilibrium outcome. Consumers have a belief qeτ
about the offered quality which, in equilibrium, coincides with the actual
expected quality E{qτ}. Hence, in the second price auction consumers bid
the expected market quality E{qτ} and the good is sold at a price E{qτ}.
The argument leads to the following result.
Lemma 1 Without certification the good is sold every period for a price
qeτ = E{qτ} = 1/2.
Due to asymmetric information all producers are pooled and consumers
are only willing to pay a uniform price reflecting the average quality in the
market. The price is therefore independent of actual quality and producers
with a high quality sell their goods at a relatively low, average price. These
producers would gain if they could prove their quality through certification.5
To study the potential of certification, assume that an honest certifier
offers producers the possibility to certify their quality at some price p. In
particular, the certifier determines the good’s quality perfectly at a personal
cost c ≥ 0 and announces it honestly. In this case, a certified good will
be sold at a price reflecting its true quality. To a producer qτ certification
therefore yields the profit pic(qτ ) ≡ qτ − p.
Instead, if a producer qτ decides to sell his good uncertified, he obtains
some price qeτ , where q
e
τ represents the consumer’s belief of the average quality
of non–certified goods. Thus, a non–certified good yields a profit pin ≡ qeτ .
Consequently, the producer certifies only if6
pic(qτ ) ≥ pin. (1)
4We focus on certification as the only way to reduce informational asymmetries and
abstract from all other remedies such as signalling and warranties.
5Hence, we focus on a distortion that is purely redistributive and not allocative. This
enables us to address the positive questions of certification in a clear, tractable way. The
final section discusses possible extensions that would enable a study of normative issues.
6We assume that an indifferent producer certifies. Due to the uniform distribution this
assumption is inconsequential.
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Since the difference in the producer’s profit pic(qτ )− pin is monotonically in-
creasing in qτ , the market with certification is a partition equilibrium. That
is, at most one producer q¯τ is indifferent concerning certification. All pro-
ducers qτ > q¯τ have a strict preference for certification, whereas all producers
qτ < q¯τ do not certify.
For the indifferent producer q¯τ it holds pi
c(q¯τ ) = pi
n and, hence, q¯τ (p) =
qeτ+p. That is, all producers with a quality of at least q¯τ (p) certify and, given
q¯τ (p) ∈ [0, 1], (expected) demand for certification is 1− q¯τ (p). Since exactly
those producers with a quality below q¯τ (p) do not certify, the consumers’
belief qeτ concerning the average quality of a non–certified product is, in
equilibrium, q¯τ (p)/2. It follows that the indifferent producer equals q¯τ (p) =
2p. Demand for certification is therefore
Dh(p) = 1− 2p.
The static monopoly price may be calculated from the certifier’s profit Πh(p) =
Dh(p)(p− c) as
pm = (1 + 2c)/4 if c ≤ 1/2. (2)
For c > 1/2, the certifier is unable to make a profit, as any price p > c > 1/2
yields no demand. Finally, the certifier obtains a maximum overall profit, if
he charges pm in every period. This yields a discounted profit of
∞∑
t=0
δtDc(pm)(pm − c) = (1− 2c)
2
8(1− δ) ,
where δ < 1 represents the discount factor.
3 Capture
Until now we assumed that the certifier reports his finding honestly. Yet,
there exists a pressure from low quality producers to have their product
certified at a higher level. Also, the certifier may simply announce some level
of quality without expending resources to determine the actual quality. This
section addresses these problems by introducing the possibility of capture.
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To model the possibility of capture we use the framework of enforceable
capture as initiated by Tirole (1986). This framework assumes that the cer-
tifier and producer can write an enforceable side-contract with transfers.7
Consumers cannot observe these side–contracts, but are fully aware of their
possibility. The framework allows us to introduce capture in a relatively
straightforward way without given explicit considerations to its enforceabil-
ity. Indeed, Martimort (1999) demonstrates the equivalence of a dynamic re-
peated framework with implicit enforceability to an enforceability approach
with a linear transaction cost of side–contracting. We introduce such a trans-
action cost by a parameter λ ≤ 1 with the interpretation that a bribe b from
the producer is only worth λb to the certifier. The parameter λ offers a con-
venient way to parameterize the potential threat of capture. For instance,
the Sony Picture case, where the producer also acted as certifier, illustrates
the extreme case λ = 1.8 In the Andersen-Enron case there were no direct
monetary bribes. Instead, bribery was of a more inefficient, indirect nature
so that λ < 1.9
The possibility of capture is introduced as follows: After a producer qτ
enters, the certifier, without observing qτ , may make an offer (b, q
b) to the
producer. The offer describes the terms at which the certifier is willing to
become captured, where b represents the required financial transfer and qb
the offered level of certification. If the producer accepts, he pays the bribe b,
which has a value λb to the certifier, and his product is certified at quality
level qb. If the producer rejects the offer, he may still ask for an honest
certification at price p. That is, a producer may insist on honest certification
simply by rejecting any capture offer (b, qb) and, subsequently, paying the
fee p. In this case, the certifier cannot manipulate the certification outcome.
7See also Laffont and Tirole (1991) and the survey in Tirole (1992) and Khalil and
Lawarre´e (1995).
8Hence, an explanation why Sony Pictures attributed its self–certifying efforts to an
independent newspaper is that it tried to convince its consumers that λ was low. Interest-
ingly, Sony Pictures was not fined for its self–certifying activities perse, but for its claim
that this “certification” was done by an independent newspaper.
9Allegedly, Andersen obtained some lucrative complementary deals in exchange for its
favorable certification services. A practise which the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 tries to
prevent. We comment on this Act in the last section.
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We motivate this assumption by following Kofman and Lawarre´e (1993) and
assume that the certifier is unable to forge certification without the help of
the producer.
Within this framework the possibility of capture may upset honest cer-
tification for two reasons. First, producers with low qualities are willing to
side–contract and capture the certifier to obtain a higher certification. Sec-
ond, when captured the certifier saves the cost c. Hence, by allowing collusion
before the certifier expends c and observes actual quality, we may analyze
these two threats simultaneously.10
We investigate consumers who stop trusting a certifier once they detect a
false testimony about a product’s quality.11 A certifier who anticipates this
behavior may be prevented from issuing forged certification reports, because
he knows that he will lose the trust and thereby the potential demand for
certification in subsequent periods.
As shown in the previous section producers only certify in an honest
equilibrium when their quality lies in the interval [2p, 1]. Hence, as soon as the
certifier reports some quality outside this interval, it is evident to consumers
that play diverged from the honest equilibrium. Consumers interpret such
deviations as a sign that the certifier is dishonest and, subsequently, believe
that the producer’s quality is zero.12
To make the behavior of consumers more precise, let hτ = (n
c
τ , q
c
τ , qτ )
denote the certification outcome in period τ , where ncτ ∈ {0, 1} indicates
whether certification in period τ took place, qcτ represents the certifier’s
claimed quality, and qτ the actual quality observed after consumption. If
certification in period τ did not take place, it holds ncτ = 0 and q
c
τ = 0. Now
10The examples in the introduction show that both concerns are important. The Enron-
Andersen and the Sony case illustrate situation in which the intent was a false certification.
The German BSE testing scandal was mainly attributed to the laboratory’s aim to cut
costs even though producers were aware of the sloppy testing procedures.
11The demise of Anderson after the Enron scandal seems to confirm such behavior.
12These extreme out–of–equilibrium beliefs are not crucial. They motivate the underly-
ing idea that a dishonest certifier receives zero profits after he has been exposed.
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let Ht = (h1, . . . , ht−1) summarize the history of certification outcomes at
the beginning of period t. Finally, let qet (q
c
t , n
c
t , Ht) represent the consumers’
belief in period t, when the consumers are faced with a certified quality qct
and have observed the certification history Ht. The consumers’ behavior may
then be captured by the following assumption about beliefs.
Assumption 1 For the consumers’ belief qet (q
c
t , n
c
t , Ht) it holds q
e
t (q
c
t , 1, Ht) =
qct whenever q
c
t ∈ [2p, 1] and {τ < t|ncτ = 1 ∧ qcτ 6= qτ} = ∅. Moreover,
qet (q
c
t , 1, Ht) = 0 whenever {τ < t|ncτ = 1 ∧ qcτ 6= qτ} 6= ∅ or qct 6∈ [2p, 1].
The assumption states that consumers believe the certifier if he announces
a quality in the interval [2p, 1] and has not cheated in previous periods.
Whenever the certifier did cheat in some former period or announces some
quality outside the interval, consumers do not trust the certifier’s claim and
believe that the quality is in fact zero. Assumption 1 therefore captures
the intuitive idea that consumers trust the certifier if they have no reason to
distrust him. Since in equilibrium beliefs are confirmed, this implies that such
equilibria are honest, in the sense that capture takes place with probability
zero.
In order to derive an equilibrium in which certification is honest, we
proceed in two steps. First we analyze the potential threat of capture by
studying the behavior of a producer when faced with a bribing offer (b, qb).
In a second step, we derive conditions under which the certifier will not make
any offer (b, qb) that is acceptable to some producer q ∈ [0, 1]. This would
imply that capture occurs with probability zero so that Assumption 1 is
consistent with the behavior of the certifier. Note that since the consumers
trust a certification level of at most 1, a bribing offer with qb = 1 poses the
largest threat of capture. Hence, in the following we focus on such offers and
talk of a bribing offer b rather than (b, 1).
Suppose the certifier makes an offer b to some producer qτ . If the producer
accepts the offer, he receives a net profit 1 − b. His profit from rejecting
the offer depends on his quality qτ and the price of certification p. If the
producer’s quality exceeds 2p, he would, according to the previous section,
9
p 1− p
α
1
2p
b
Figure 1: Acceptance probability α(b|p) in an honest equilibrium
certify and receive a profit qτ − p. Consequently, in an honest equilibrium a
producer qτ ≥ 2p rejects the offer only if 1− b ≤ qτ − p. On the other hand,
a producer with quality qτ < 2p does not certify in an honest equilibrium
and receives a profit p. Hence, he rejects the offer if 1 − b ≤ p. Since a
producer’s quality is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], it follows that, in an
honest equilibrium, the expected acceptance probability of a capture offer b
is
α(b|p) =


1 if b < p
1 + p− b if b ∈ [p, 1− p)
0 if b ≥ 1− p.
Figure 1 illustrates the acceptance probability graphically. Using this
probability one may calculate the certifier’s expected payoff V (b|p) from an
offer b. For b < p all producers accept the offer and the certifier obtains a
profit V (b|p) = λb. For b ∈ [p, 1 − p] only producers qτ < 1 + p − b accept,
while producers qτ ≥ 1 + p − b reject and apply for honest certification.
Hence, the certifier’s profit is V (b|p) = (1+p− b)λb+(b−p)(p− c+δV h(p)).
Whenever b ≥ 1 − p all producers reject and the certifier obtains V (b|p) =
V h(p) = (1− 2p)(p− c)/(1− δ).
The payoff V (b|p) represents the certifier’s expected payoff from the offer
b. If it exceeds the certifier’s payoff from honest certification, V h(p), the cer-
tifier is better off becoming captured with the associated probability α(b|p).
Consequently, we may interpret V (b|p) as the threat of the offer b to honest
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certification. We say that certification at a price p is capture proof if and
only if
V h(p) ≥ V (b|p) (3)
for all b. That is, Assumption 1 is consistent with equilibrium play only when
Condition (3) holds. Hence, only in this case we obtain an equilibrium in
which reputation prevents capture. An analysis of Condition (3) yields the
following result:
Proposition 1 An equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 is capture proof. It
exists if and only if
δ ≥ δc(p) ≡ λ(1− p)
λ(1− p) + (1− 2p)(p− c) .
The proposition shows that the discount factor plays a crucial role for
the existence of honest, i.e., capture proof, equilibria. As is well–known
from the literature on repeated games, it determines the relative weights of
the short run gain — the bribe b — and the long run loss of capture —
relinquishing future orders for certification. Since the price of certification
p determines the certifier’s profit from future orders, the critical discount
factor, δc(p), itself depends on the price p. Figure 2 plots the typical shape
of the curve δc(p). The shaded area illustrates the combinations of (p, δ) for
which capture proofness is sustainable. As formally proved in the appendix
the curve δc(p) is convex and obtains a minimum. These properties of δc(p)
yield the following insight.
Proposition 2 For any discount factor δ ≥ δ∗ there exists an interval of
prices [pl(δ), ph(δ)] which sustain truthful certification, where
δ∗ ≡ λ
3− 2√2− 2c− 2c+ λ
and
pl(δ) ≡ min
p
{p|δc(p) = δ} and ph(δ) ≡ max
p
{p|δc(p) = δ}.
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c 1/2pm p∗
δc(pm)
δ∗
δc(p)
δ
1
p
CP
Figure 2: Capture proof (CP) combinations of (p, δ).
Hence, for a given discount factor δ > δ∗ there exist multiple prices that
sustain truthful certification. The most preferable price from the perspective
of the certifier is the monopoly price pm as, under honest certification, this
price yields the certifier the highest payoff. Yet, as Figure 2 indicates, at
relatively low discount factors honest certification may require a price that
exceeds the monopoly price pm.
Proposition 3 It holds δ∗ < δc(pm). I.e., for all δ ∈ [δ∗, δc(pm)) only prices
that exceed the static monopoly price pm sustain honest certification.
At first sight the result is counter intuitive. The static monopoly price
yields the certifier the highest per period payoff and, thereby, maximizes
the long run penalty from becoming captured, i.e., losing future monopoly
profits. This suggests that a monopoly price minimizes the overall threat
of capture. Yet, the argument neglects that also the short run gain from
capture depends on the price p. Indeed, at the monopoly price pm there is
no first order effect of a price change on the certifier’s profit. Hence, the
question whether the critical discount factor δc increases or decreases at pm
depends only on the effect of a price change on the short run gain. Figure
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1 reveals that a raise in p has an ambiguous effect. On the one hand, a
higher p reduces the maximum bribe b = 1−p that non–certifying producers
are willing to pay. On the other hand, a higher p raises the minimum bribe
b = p at which all producers accept. The following lemma shows that the
maximum threat of capture comes from an offer b = 1−p so that the relevant
effect is the former one.
Lemma 2 In a capture proof equilibrium the threat of capture, V c(b|p), is
maximized for b = 1 − p. At the monopoly price pm the maximum threat of
capture, V c(1− p|p), is decreasing in p.
From Lemma 2 it follows that a marginal increase from the monopoly
price pm reduces the overall threat of capture and therefore allows a reduction
of the critical discount factor. Consequently, δc(p) is decreasing at pm and
obtains its minimum δ∗ at a price that exceeds pm. This explains that the
principle underlying the result of Proposition 3 differs from that found in the
literature on signalling (e.g. Bagwell and Riordan 1991), where a credible
signalling of high quality may require prices exceeding the monopoly price.
Until now we investigated the existence of capture proof equilibria for
some exogenously given price of certification p. In the remainder of this sec-
tion we look at the optimal pricing behavior of a monopolistic certifier.13 In
this case, the price of certification becomes an explicit strategic variable and
consumers may interpret it as a signal about the certifier’s honesty. We must
therefore extend qet (q
c
t , n
c
t , Ht) to include p and write q
e
t (q
c
t , n
c
t , Ht, p). Since
out–of–equilibrium beliefs regarding the price of certification are, in princi-
ple, arbitrary, a multiplicity of equilibria obtains. For instance, it is easy
to sustain any price p¯ ∈ [pl(δ), ph(δ)] as an equilibrium price by specifying
that consumers interpret all other prices as set by a dishonest certifier. Such
out–of–equilibrium beliefs prevent the monopolist from charging any other
price than p¯. To avoid such arbitrariness, we extend the intuitive principle
underlying Assumption 1 that consumers trust a certifier if they have no
compelling reason to distrust him. Effectively, consumers therefore separate
13Formally, we extend the game by an initial stage, where the certifiers chooses the price
p. The equilibrium in Proposition 1 is then an equilibrium of the subgame given a price p.
13
prices in two categories; prices that can sustain honest certification and prices
which cannot:
Assumption 2 For the consumers’ beliefs it holds qet (q
c
t , 1, Ht, p) = q
c
t when-
ever δ(p) ≤ δ, qct ∈ [2p, 1], and {τ < t|ncτ = 1 ∧ qcτ 6= qτ} = ∅. Moreover, for
δ(p) ≤ δ it holds qet (qct , 1, Ht, p) = 0 whenever {τ < t|ncτ = 1 ∧ qcτ 6= qτ} 6= ∅
or qct 6∈ [2p, 1].
Beliefs that satisfy Assumption 2 imply the following equilibrium outcome:
Proposition 4 In any equilibrium satisfying Assumption 2 certification takes
place if and only if δ ≥ δ∗. In any such equilibrium the monopolistic certi-
fier sets pˆm = max{pm, pl(δ)}. Whenever δ < δ∗ honest certification is not
sustainable and the monopolist’s profit is zero.
The proposition shows that the monopolist’s pricing behavior depends
on the discount factor. First, for large discount factors the static monopoly
price is able to sustain honest certification and, since this price gives the
highest per period payoff, the monopolist has no incentive to deviate from
it. In this case, the certifier charges higher prices than needed to sustain
honest certification. Second, when the discount factor is small, consumers
anticipate that even high prices of certification cannot prevent the certifier
from becoming captured. Consequently, they will not trust the certifier and
the monopolist is unable to derive a profit from certification. Third, for
intermediate values of the discount factor, the static monopoly price is unable
to sustain honest certification. As consumers recognize this, the monopolist
is forced to charge a price that exceeds the static monopoly price.
4 Price Competition
The previous section showed that for relatively high discount rates, a mo-
nopolistic certifier charges prices that are higher than the minimum price at
which honest certification is sustainable. This raises the question whether
price competition from competing certifiers may lead to lower prices. More-
over, the sustainability of honest certification depends crucially on the possi-
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bility of maintaining prices that exceed costs. Since price competition tends
to lower prices, it may undermine the viability of certification markets.
To address these questions we first extend the monopolistic model to
allow for price competition. Suppose there exist N > 1 certifiers who each,
at the beginning of the game, commit to a price of certification pj.
14 All
certifiers face the same discount factor δ. They are equally efficient, i.e., may
all certify a product at costs c. After setting prices producers enter and exit
sequentially. We assume that the producer’s choice whether and where to
certify is observable by consumers and subsequent producers. We assume
further that each producer uses at most one certifier.
Consequently, let ncτ ∈ {0, . . . , N} in the consumers’ information set Ht
denote the certifier who performed the certification in period τ . Whenever
certification did not take place, it holds ncτ = 0 and q
c
τ = 0. The consumers’
beliefs in period t may be written as qe(qct , n
c
t , Ht, p), where p = (p1, . . . , pN)
is the vector of prices set by the certifiers.
Before analyzing the market game with price competition between certi-
fiers, we first establish a preliminary result concerning the relation between
market structure and the price of certification p.
Lemma 3 Suppose δ ≥ δ∗. At a price pl(δ) honest certification is sustainable
only if the entire demand for certification is satisfied by a unique certifier.
Effectively, the proposition shows that the lowest price at which honest
certification is sustainable is only attainable in a monopoly. The reason for
this is straightforward. Honest certification depends on the threat that a
certifier loses enough future payoffs. Yet, if multiple certifiers are active, the
expected number of future certification jobs for a single certifier is smaller, as
total demand is shared with others. In order to compensate for the reduced
number of jobs the benefits of a single job, i.e., its price, must be larger to
prevent capture.
This intuition indicates that, even though certification itself is a technol-
ogy with constant returns to scale, honest certification exhibits increasing
14As we will discuss in Section 6 commitment is not a crucial assumption.
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returns to scale. If future demand for certification is higher, then honest
certification can be achieved at lower prices, i.e., from the perspective of
producers, at lower costs. Note that we obtained this feature endogenously,
implying that the increasing return to scale has an economic rather than a
technological origin. As the remainder of this section verifies, this reasoning
also suggests that certification markets display characteristics of a natural
monopoly and possess a tendency towards monopolization.
Since consumers now observe multiple prices, we have to extend our as-
sumption on out–of–equilibrium beliefs. Continuing the idea that consumers
trust certifiers if they have no reason to distrust them, we adapt Assumption
2 as follows:
Assumption 3 If pk ∈ min{pj|δ(pj) < δ}, qct ∈ [2pk, 1] and {τ < t|ncτ =
k ∧ qcτ 6= qτ} = ∅, then qet (qct , k,Ht, p) = qct . Moreover, if nct > 0 then
qet (q
c
t , n
c
t , Ht, p) = 0 whenever {τ < t|ncτ = nct ∧ qcτ 6= qτ} 6=6 ∅ or qct 6∈ [2pnct , 1].
The assumption states that consumers trust certifiers who charge the
lowest price such that δ(pj) < δ. It is therefore weaker than a straightforward
extension of Assumption 2 to all certifiers. The following proposition shows
that the assumption implies the following equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 5 An equilibrium in which Assumption 3 is satisfied exists. In
any such equilibrium certification is performed honestly by a unique certifier
at price pl(δ).
The proposition shows that price competition leads to a monopolization
of the market. The driving mechanism leading to the result is Lemma 3.
Assumption 3 thereby only ensures that price competition “works” in that
it drives down prices. As in a classic Bertrand competition model, certifiers
have an incentive to undercut any price p > pl(δ). Yet, a certifier cannot ef-
fectively undercut the price pl(δ), because consumers anticipate that at such
prices, the certifier will not stay honest. Hence, the only remaining candi-
date is the price pl(δ), but according to Lemma 3 honest certification at this
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price is only sustainable if a unique certifier performs all certification. Con-
sequently, effective price competition yields a monopolization of certification
markets. Interestingly, this result is consistent with the empirical observation
that certification markets tend to be highly concentrated.
5 Long Lived Producers
Until now we assumed that the certifiers are long–lived, whereas producers
were short–lived. Producers therefore could not build a reputation them-
selves and this asymmetry created a demand for external certification. The
results in the previous sections, however, indicate that a demand for exter-
nal certification may exist even when producers are long–lived. Indeed, this
section confirms the idea that by accumulating the certification jobs of dif-
ferent producers it is easier for an external certifier to maintain a credible
reputation for honesty than for each producer individually.
Let there be m long–lived producers. Producers produce sequentially, in
that a producer a ∈ {1, . . . ,m} produces a single good in periods a,m +
a, 2m + a, . . ..15 The quality of a producer differs over the periods and is
drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution over [0, 1].16 As before, the pro-
ducer observes the quality directly, whereas consumers only observe it after
consumption. The good is sold in a second price auction and the discount
factor is δ.
Playing a repeated game himself, a producer may try to build his own
reputation by announcing his current quality before selling it to the market.
In line with our previous belief restrictions, let consumers believe the pro-
ducer’s announcement if they have no reason to mistrust him. That is, they
believe the producer if he has not cheated in previous periods. Otherwise,
they believe that the quality is zero. These beliefs are only confirmed in
15The sequential structure is not crucial, but allows us to apply our previous results
directly to this extension.
16Clearly, if the quality of a producer is drawn only once and remains fixed over the
periods, reputation is not sustainable in equilibrium. A producer with a quality close to
zero always has an incentive to mimic higher ones.
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equilibrium if the producer’s announcement is indeed truthful. Hence, a nec-
essary condition for the existence of such an equilibrium is that no producer
has an incentive to cheat and claim a false quality. Clearly, a producer with
a current quality of zero has the strongest incentive to cheat and announce
a quality of 1 in order to receive a current profit of 1. Instead, when the
producer remains honest, he receives an expected payoff of
0 +
∞∑
t=1
(δm)t 1/2 =
δm
2− 2δm ,
as his expected quality in each future period is 1/2. Hence, producers are
able to build up their own reputation only if
δ ≥ δe ≡
(
2
3
)1/m
.
Now consider that as an alternative to building his own reputation a
producer may turn to an external certifier. Clearly, whenever δ ≥ δe, it will
not be profitable to do so, because external certification requires an additional
cost p without providing an additional service. However, an external certifier,
who accumulates the certification jobs from multiple producers, may sustain
honest certification at lower discount factors than a single producer. This
insight yields the following result:
Proposition 6 There exists a demand for external certification for discount
factors δ ∈ [δ∗, δe], whenever
λ
3− 2√2− 2c− 2c+ λ <
(
2
3
)1/m
. (4)
The proposition shows that there is a potential demand for external cer-
tification if the number of producers, m, is large and the parameters λ and
c are small enough. It is instructive to discuss the role of these parameters
in turn.
First, a demand for external certification obtains when m is large. This
observation demonstrates the accumulation effect of external certification. If
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an individual producer tries to build up his own reputation, he has to ensure
that his long run gain from staying honest outweighs the short run gain
from cheating. Even though the external certifier is in a similar position,
his ability to accumulate certification jobs implies that the certifier’s long
run gain from honesty is higher than that of an individual producer. The
more producers, the larger this difference. In contrast, the short run gain
from cheating is independent of the number of producers. This is because
a certifier may collect at most the short run gain of an individual producer
rather than all producers together. Hence, the crucial observation is that an
external certifier accumulates only the long run gains from staying honest,
but not the short run ones from cheating. Hence, Proposition 6 identifies
endogenous benefits from specialization. It is easier for a single institution
— the external certifier — to provide a reputation than for many individual
ones — the producers.
Second, a demand for certification is established for λ small enough. This
emphasizes a second beneficial effect from external certification. Since λ
represent a direct, inverted cost of capture, a lower λ makes it more costly for
a producer to capture the certifier. Consequently, a smaller λ makes honest
certification easier to achieve. In contrast, cheating on one’s own reputation
does not involve a cost and hence a potential for external supervision exists
if λ is low.
Finally, inequality (4) requires that the certifier’s identification costs c are
small. Indeed, when c rises, the certifier’s long run gain from staying honest
decreases. Since a producer observes his quality without incurring any costs,
it is intuitive that a demand for external certification exists only if c is small
enough.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper derives conditions under which reputation is an effective mecha-
nism for external certifiers to resist capture and to maintain their honesty.
The need for reputation induces a demand for external certification, because
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a credible reputation is easier to establish when it is concentrated. In ad-
dition, for low discount rates honest certification requires high prices that
exceed the static monopoly price. It moreover exhibits features of a natural
monopoly and represents a technology with increasing returns to scale.
The introduction motivates the study of capture with actual cases where
capture did occur. In contrast, in the equilibria of the current paper such
events only occur out–of–equilibrium. This raises the question whether the
paper’s framework may also explain capture as an equilibrium event. Follow-
ing the logic of the folk theorem, this is clearly the case. For instance, one
may construct equilibria in which the certifier colludes every second period.
However, since these equilibria presume that consumers rationally anticipate
capture, they do not provide a convincing explanation for cases such as the
Enron–Anderson scandal, where there was a large public outcry. On the
contrary, public behavior was much more in accordance with the paper’s
trigger strategies that described the consumer’s extreme behavior off–the–
equilibrium–path; after Anderson was exposed, it lost all public credibility
and the firm went bankrupt. In fact, despite its obvious threat to certifi-
cation, the number of documented cases of capture are relatively small in
practise. More often there are only indications of capture. Following Rotem-
berg and Saloner (1986) indications of capture rather than actual capture
may be generated as an equilibrium phenomenon in the current framework.
In particular, when the detection technology of the consumers is imperfect,
one may generate indications of capture and subsequent punishments as an
equilibrium outcome similar to the equilibrium price wars in Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986).
In order to analyze the problem we made a set of simplifying assump-
tions. First, we assumed a perfect detection technology of the certifier and
also the consumer. This allows a straightforward application of the standard
theory of repeated games. If either the certifier’s or the consumers’ detection
mechanism is imperfect, consumers cannot determine the certifier’s honesty
with certainty. In this case one has to resort to the more complicated the-
ory of repeated games with imperfect public information (e.g. Fudenberg,
Levine and Maskin 1994). Second, we assumed that at the beginning of the
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game certifiers commit for once and for all to a price of certification p. This
assumption is not crucial; one may also assume that prices are chosen each
period. For the monopoly case one may even dispense with the assumption
that consumers observe prices. In the setting with competition, the observ-
ability of the price p is important. However, the assumption that consumers
observe all other variables such as the discount rate or the certifier’s cost is
not crucial. Indeed, qualitative results remain unchanged, as long as there
exists a range of prices [pl, ph] for which honest certification is sustainable
for any realization of these variables. In this case, consumers can, without
knowing the exact realization, be sure that a price p ∈ [pl, ph] induces a
certifier to stay honest. Again, the lowest price pl will only be sustainable
in monopoly. Third, because this paper focuses on the problem of capture
rather than one–sided opportunistic behavior, we did not allow the certifier
to forge a certification outcome by himself even though he may save the cost
c this way. For λ = 1 this possibility does not affect the outcome, because
taking the payment p and certifying at some false quality q yields the certifier
less than a bribing offer (p, 1). Finally, the paper uses a specific extensive
form to model capture. Other, more sophisticated extensive forms may be
studied. For instance, instead of asking a uniform bribe b, the certifier may
elicit the producer’s private information through a general mechanism. Also,
producers may be given the possibility to signal their private information,
or given a second chance of bribing after the certifier learns the true quality.
Although the exact extensive form may affect parts of the analysis, the main
findings of an advantage of concentration and the need for super monopoly
pricing are due to general principles which do not depend on the specific
extensive form.
In our setup certification addresses distributive distortions rather than al-
locative ones. Hence, certification has no positive effect on social welfare and
the framework cannot be used to study normative questions. The advantage
of this setup is that it illustrates the main issues in a transparent way. The
intuition behind our results is nevertheless general and robust if we extend
the framework to address allocative distortions. A straightforward exten-
sion is to introduce moral hazard on part of the producers and assume that
21
producers actively choose their quality level. This extension would give cer-
tification a welfare enhancing effect, because it induces producers to choose
higher, more socially efficient qualities.
Finally, we want to close this paper with a remark concerning the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 which demands a separation of accounting and consulting
services in the US. The Act was introduced after the Enron–Andersen scan-
dal and the separation is meant to reduce the threat of capture in accounting.
However, if honest certification is based on the reputation arguments of this
paper, the separation may actually exacerbate the threat of capture. The
Act reduces the amount of future rents to honest certification and, hence, it
pays the certifier less to remain honest. In popular debate this effect of the
Act does not seem to have been recognized.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: In any equilibrium in which Assumption 1 holds
capture may not take place, since otherwise the beliefs of consumers are not
consistent with the behavior of the certifier. Hence, condition (3) must be
satisfied for all b. This is the case if and only if for all b ∈ [p, 1− p] it holds
(1 + p− b)λb+ (b− p)(p− c+ δV h(p)) ≤ V h(p), (5)
where V h(p) = (1− 2p)(p− c)/(1− δ). Solving (5) with respect to δ yields
δ ≥ δ˜(b) ≡ bλ(1− b+ p)− (1− b− p)(p− c)
2p(p− c)(b− p) + bλ((1− p)− b+ 2p) .
Consequently, capture does not take place if and only if δ ≥ δ(b) for all
b ∈ [p, 1− p], i.e. if δ ≥ maxb∈[p,1−p] δ(b). It holds
δ′(b) =
(p− c)(1− 2p)((1− b+ p)2λ+ 2p(p− c))
[bλ(1 + p− b) + 2(b− p)(p− c)p]2 > 0.
Hence, δ(b) is increasing in b and obtains its maximum
δ˜(1− p) ≡ λ(1− p)
λ(1− p) + (1− 2p)(p− c)
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at the corner solution b = 1−p. It follows that if an equilibrium exists which
satisfies Assumption 1, it must hold
δ > δc(p) ≡ δ˜(1− p).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We first demonstrate convexity of δc(p). The
second derivative of δc(p) computes as
∂2δ(p)
∂p2
=
2λ(1 + 2c2 − 6p+ 12p2 − 4p3 + c(1− 6p) + λ(1− c))
[(p− c)(1− 2p) + λ(1− p)]3 (6)
The denominator is positive, hence the sign of (6) depends on the numerator.
Since λ ≥ 0 and c < 1, the numerator is positive if 1 + 2c2 − 6p + 12p2 −
4p3 + c(1 − 6p) is positive. The expression is quadratic in c and obtains
a minimum at c = (6p − 1)/4 of (1 − 2p)2(7 − 8p)/8 which is positive for
p ≤ 1/2. Consequently, also the numerator in (6) is positive and the second
derivative of δc(p) is positive, which implies convexity.
From the convexity of δc(p) it follows that first order conditions are suf-
ficient for a minimum. Taking first order conditions yields
δ∗ ≡ λ
3− 2√2− 2c− 2c+ λ
and obtains for p∗ = 1 −
√
(1− c)/2. Due to c ≤ 1/2, it follows that p∗ ∈
(pm, 1). From the continuity of δc(p), δc(c) = δc(1/2) = 1 and the existence
of a minimum δ∗ on [0, 1] it follows that for any δ ∈ (δ∗, 1] that there exist
a price such that δc(p) = δ. Due to the convexity of δc(p) it holds for any
price p ∈ [pl(δ), ph(δ) that δ > δ(p). From Proposition 1 it follows then that
truthful certification for price p is sustainable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof of Proposition 2 shows δc(p) obtains a
minimum at p∗ = 1−
√
(1− c)/2. Due to c ≤ 1/2, it holds p∗ > pm. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: For b ∈ [p, 1 − p] a bribe is accepted with positive
probability and yields the principal V c(b|p) = (1 − b + p)bλ + (p − b)(p −
c)(1− 2δp)/(1− δ). The derivative w.r.t. b is
(1 + p− 2b)λ− (p− c)(1− 2δp)/(1− δ) (7)
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which is linearly decreasing in b and therefore greater than
(1 + p− 2(1− p))λ− (p− c)(1− 2δp)/(1− δ). (8)
The derivative of (8) w.r.t. δ is (p−c)(1−2p)/(1−δ)2 > 0 and, therefore, (8)
is increasing in δ. Since capture proofness implies that δ > δc(p) it implies
that (8) is greater than (p− c)(1− 2p)/(1− δ)2, which is greater than zero.
It follows that the derivative V c(b|p) w.r.t. b itself is larger than zero and
attains its maximum at b = 1− p. That is,
V max(p) ≡ V c(1− p|p) = (p− c)(1− 2p)(1− 2δp) + (2(1− p)pλ)(1− δ)
1− δ .
It holds
∂V max
∂p
|p=pm= (1− 2c)(4λ(1− δ)− δ(1− 2c)
4(1− δ) . (9)
Expression (9) is decreasing in δ, because the derivative of (9) with respect
to δ is −(1 − 2c)2/(4(1 − δ)2) < 0. Since it holds δ ≥ δc(pm) it follows that
(9) is less than −(1 + 2c)λ/2 and therefore negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: In any equilibrium that satisfies Assumption 2
capture occurs with zero probability, since otherwise any belief that satisfies
Assumption 2 is not consistent with the behavior of the certifier. Hence, if
certification is to take place, Proposition 1 implies that for any equilibrium
price pˆm it holds that δ ≥ δc(pˆm). As δc(pˆm) ≥ δ∗ it follows δ ≥ δ∗. More-
over, for pˆm to be an equilibrium price, it must be optimal for the certifier.
Consequently, Assumption 2 is consistent only with an equilibrium price that
solves
max
{p|δ(p)≤δ}
V h(p)
which implies pˆm = max{pm, pl(δ)}. To show existence of such an equilibrium
take the out–of–equilibrium beliefs qet (q
c
t , n
c
t , Ht, p) = 0 for δ(p) > δ and
nct > 0 and q
e
t (q
c
t , 0, Ht, p) = pˆ
m. These beliefs ensure that any price p′ with
δ(p′) > δ yields the certifier zero profit, such that pˆm is indeed optimal.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: For a price pl(δ) it holds per definition that V
h(pl(δ)) =
maxb V (b|pl(δ)), where V h(pl(δ)) = ∑t=1 δtDh(pl(δ))(pl(δ)−c). Hence, V h(pl(δ))
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is the payoff of a certifier who sets the price pl(δ) and receives the demand
from any producer q ≥ 2pl(δ) If some of this demand is served by some other
certifier, the payoff from honest certification is strictly less than V h(pl(δ))
such that condition (3) is violated. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N) represent a vector of equilibrium
prices. Define p¯ = min{p∗i |δ(p∗i ) ≤ δ}. In any equilibrium p¯ exists, because
otherwise all certifiers make zero profit and any certifier is better off setting
a price pl(δ) + ε which yields a strictly positive profit. Suppose p¯ > pl(δ),
then there exists at least one certifier who does not receive the entire demand
for certification. This certifier is better off when he undercuts the price p¯ by
some ε > 0. In this case, he is the certifier that offers the lowest price greater
than δ such that assumption 3 implies that consumers will trust him. Hence,
all producers have a strict incentive to perform their certification at this
certifier rather than a different one. Consequently, whenever p¯ > pl(δ), there
exists a certifier who has an incentive to deviate. Thus, in any equilibrium
that satisfies Assumption 3 it must hold p¯ = pl(δ).
To show existence, define the following beliefs qet (q
c
t , 0, Ht, p) = pl(δ) and
qet (q
c
t , 1, Ht, p) = q
c
t whenever q
c
t ∈ [2pi, 1], {τ < t|ncτ = i ∧ qcτ 6= qτ} = ∅
and pi > pl(δ). Moreover, q
e
t (q
c
t , 1, Ht, p) = q
c
t whenever q
c
t ∈ [2p1, 1], {τ <
t|ncτ = 1∧ qcτ 6= qτ} = ∅ and p1 = pl(δ). Otherwise, qet (qct , i, Ht, p) = 0. These
beliefs satisfy Assumption 3. Let p1 = . . . = pN = pl(δ) and let a producer
qτ ∈ [2pl(δ), 1] certify at certifier 1 and let all producers qτ ∈ [0, 2pl(δ)) offer
their goods uncertified. It is straightforward to show that these beliefs and
strategies constitute an equilibrium with the outcome that all producers with
q ∈ [2p1, 1] certify at certifier 1, who certifies honestly at a price pl(δ). Q.E.D.
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